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Market riskMulti-asset class, multimarket central counterparties (CCPs) are becoming less uncommon as a result of
merges between specialized (single-asset class, single market) CCPs and market demands for greater cap-
ital efﬁciency. Yet, traditional CCP risk management models often lack the necessary sophistication to
estimate potential losses relative to the closeout process of a defaulter’s portfolio in a multi-asset class,
multimarket environment. As a result, multi-asset class, multimarket CCPs usually rely on a simpliﬁed
silo approach for risk calculation which not only fails to deliver efﬁciency, but may also increase systemic
risk. The CORE (Closeout Risk Evaluation) approach, on the other hand, provides conceptual and mathe-
matical tools necessary for robust and efﬁcient central counterparty risk evaluation in multi-asset class
and multimarket environments, acknowledging the portfolio dynamics involved in the closeout process
as well as important ‘‘real life’’ market frictions.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Clearinghouses have long contributed to the ﬁnancial services
industry by handling, in an efﬁcient and safe manner, the daunting
amount of settlement transactions resulting from trading activity
in a number of different asset classes. From the institutions which
supported the ﬂourishing 18th century banking industry in Lon-
don, as presented in Norman (2011), to the global infrastructure
providers that successfully handled the 2008 crisis, the number
of clearinghouse failures has been exceptionally small, both in
nominal and relative terms, particularly compared to banks and
insurers.
One important service provided by many clearinghouses, apart
from the activities related to centralized clearing and settlement, is
acting as a central counterparty (CCP) for all cleared transactions.
Central counterparties are commonly deﬁned as ﬁnancial marketinfrastructures (FMIs) that interpose themselves between counter-
parties on contracts traded in one or more ﬁnancial markets,
becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer,
thereby assuring the performance of open contracts, as detailed
in CPSS/IOSCO (2012). As a result, clearinghouse participants
exchange multiple heterogeneous credit relationships (i.e. risks)
for a single, homogeneous credit risk presented by the CCP.
The beneﬁts of employing a CCP model for a given asset class
range from avoiding gridlocks and unwinding procedures in the
settlement process, to enhancing price discovery mechanisms that
result from the single credit risk feature. Yet, systemic risk reduc-
tion is unquestionably the most important single value offered by
CCPs as a consequence of netting, collateralization and orderly
default procedures.3 Those procedures are designed to eliminate
or mitigate the impacts of a participant default, thus avoiding settle-
ment disruptions and disordered resolution processes. Empirical
studies, such as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and the literature on this
subject, such as Acharya et al. (2010), maintain that the emergence
of systemic risk is often related to speciﬁc characteristics such as
size, leverage, concentration and interconnectedness. Although notin which
n (2006),
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contract is, by deﬁnition, equal to zero, CCPs can be exposed to siz-
able positions in the case of a participant default. Thus, it is necessity
to maintain robust safeguard structures, capable of dealing with one
or more (simultaneous) participant defaults, even in the face of
extremely adverse market conditions.
The key element of a typical CCP safeguard structure for that
case consists of margin deposits, that is, assets and cash (i.e. collat-
eral) participants post in the CCP to cover their losses should they
fail. Margin calculation methodologies experienced a rapid
increase in complexity during the turn of the 20th century, evolv-
ing from purely ad hoc ﬁxed performance bonds to risk based port-
folio margining. This evolution essentially reﬂected the need to
clear new products that were not only more complex, but also
contingent on one or more underlying assets. Yet, despite the
increasing complexity of cleared products, clearinghouses tended
to cling to speciﬁc asset classes such as equities, ﬁnancial deriva-
tives, energy derivatives and so on. This reﬂected not only their
specialization, but also their particular ownership structures,
where large ﬁnancial intermediaries were participants and owners
at the same time.
However, the demutualization movement, which from a
practical standpoint began in 1992 with Deutsche Börse, was
followed by an IPO wave that reshaped the ownership and gover-
nance structures of major global clearinghouses. This also set the
basis for clearinghouse merges, turning specialized (single-asset
class, single market) clearinghouses into multi-asset class, multi-
market environments. An exhaustive account on the evolution of
the clearinghouse landscape can be found in Russo et al. (2002).
At this moment, despite difﬁcult market conditions, there is no
clear evidence that consolidation movements have exhausted their
momentum, especially considering the renewed regulatory
emphasis for more collateralized transactions and, as a result, mar-
ket demands for efﬁcient capital allocation.
Hence, margin methodologies now have to take a great leap for-
ward in order to deal with this Brave New World of multi-asset
class, multimarket CCPs. Yet, this is not as simple as just revamping
existing models, enhancing their capacity to deal with new asset
classes and markets. Indeed, mainstreammargin calculation meth-
odologies are, more often than not, asset class and market speciﬁc,
able only to manage homogeneous portfolios, that is, portfolios in
which assets have similar characteristics. In fact, estimating poten-
tial losses relative to the closeout process of a defaulter’s portfolio,
when the portfolio comprises multiple asset-classes and markets
(i.e. is highly heterogeneous) poses a number of important chal-
lenges in terms of risk modeling.
The objective of this paper is to present a risk methodology
which estimates potential losses relative to the closeout process
of a defaulter’s portfolio in multiple asset-class, multimarket CCPs.
This methodology, denominated CORE (Closeout Risk Evaluation),
takes into account important differences related to the closeout
processes concerning individual asset classes and markets, thus
yielding more realistic risk estimates. The paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 presents the CORE methodology, evidencing its
differences from mainstream, single asset-class, single market
approaches. Sections 3–5 describe the main components of the
methodology, namely the deﬁnition of the optimal closeout strat-
egy, the estimation of potential losses given the closeout strategy
and the c-value calculation. Sections 6 and 7 present practical
results and Section 8 concludes the paper.2. The CORE methodology
The vast majority of the risk methodologies currently employed
by the ﬁnancial industry trace their origins to a commonforefather: the value-at-risk approach, VaR, introduced in the early
1990s by J.P. Morgan with the publication of the RiskMetrics tech-
nical document, whose details can be obtained on Dufﬁe and Pan
(1997), and with some adaptations on Bangia et al. (1999), as well
as classical references of Jorion (2003, 2007). One of its most
appealing attributes was the ability to express the aggregate mar-
ket risk of a given portfolio with just a single number that repre-
sented the potential ﬁnancial loss in the context of a ﬁxed
holding period and a given conﬁdence level. This ‘‘single risk ﬁg-
ure’’ concept strongly inﬂuenced the development of traditional
CCP risk management models, as it could be easily translated into
a margin requirement. Thus, despite differences in the way future
states of the world were represented (Monte Carlo simulations vs.
parametric distributions vs. historical data vs. stress testing, for
instance) and risk calculated (full valuation vs. linear approxima-
tions, for instance), the ‘‘single risk ﬁgure’’/margin equivalence
became the norm.
An important limitation, though, is that the ‘‘single risk ﬁgure’’
represents a loss in market value relative to the whole portfolio at
some pre-deﬁned moment in the future. In other words, it pictures
the same portfolio at two different moments (today and future)
and then calculates the difference (loss) in terms of market value.
Transposed to the CCP world, this means that all defaulter’s posi-
tions would have to be liquidated (closed out) at the same time
and, consequently, in the same market scenario. Although this
can be considered as a fairly accurate proxy for the potential losses
relative to the closeout process of a defaulter’s portfolio in the case
of just one asset class (for instance, only futures or only equities),
this is not necessarily true for highly heterogeneous portfolios. Dif-
ferences concerning market practices, trading mechanisms, price
discovery processes, liquidity proﬁles, fungibility, cash ﬂow struc-
tures, convertibility, settlement procedures and the like make it
difﬁcult to compute coherent risk estimates considering only two
points in the time continuum. This problem is usually circum-
vented using a silo approach, where ﬁnancial instruments belong-
ing to comparable asset classes are grouped together into silos that
do not communicate with each other, so the total portfolio risk is
given by the sum of the risks of each individual silo. Additionally,
sometimes very simple ad hoc ‘‘credit spreads’’ allows for limited
risk offsetting (i.e. margin relief) between different silos.
Unfortunately, simply avoiding risk underestimation does not
necessarily mean reducing systemic risk in the context of the
CCP. Failure to capture hedges between different asset classes
and markets in the silo approach means heftier margin require-
ments for protected positions relative to outright, riskier portfolios.
Therefore, apart from not providing the right incentives to hedge
positions across different asset classes and markets, the silo
approach can also increase systemic risk by escalating margin
requirements for hedged portfolios in the presence of adverse mar-
ket conditions. Taken to the limit, this means that a participant
could collapse due to increasing margin requirements, albeit being
hedged.
The CORE methodology was speciﬁcally developed to tackle the
problem of estimating central counterparty risk in a multi-asset
class, multimarket environment, overcoming the ‘‘single risk ﬁg-
ure’’/‘‘multiple-silos’’ model deﬁciencies described previously. A
detailed comparison of the approaches, alongside with several
other important features of the methodology, may be obtained in
BM&FBovespa (2011). Albeit generally used as an example of ‘‘sin-
gle risk ﬁgure’’ methodology, it is important to emphasize that this
paper’s objective is not to propose an evaluation of the VaR model
per se. This would outrun the objectives set forth in the previous
section, while there are already many valuable contributions on
this subject.
One of the key features of the CORE methodology concerns its
ability to recognize that closeout processes are dynamic, so the
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settled through time. This allows the model to deﬁne a closeout
strategy that, while minimizing the total risk, takes into account
important trading, settlement and liquidity constraints. For
instance, a given position on asset A can be immediately liquidated
on t þ 1, whereas its hedge/risk offsetting position on asset B can
only be reverted on t þ 2 due to a local holiday. Likewise, a given
OTC position C may not admit partial liquidation, whereas its
hedge/risk offsetting position in listed futures is not subject to such
a restriction. Thus, selecting the appropriate closeout strategy
entails deﬁning the closeout sequence (that is, which asset, at
which amount and at what time) that minimizes potential ﬁnan-
cial losses while respecting, at the same time, trading, settlement
and liquidity constraints.
The second component of the CORE methodology consists in
estimating the potential changes in market value for all assets in
the portfolio under analysis considering, for this purpose, the port-
folio dynamics established by the closeout strategy. This can be
accomplished in a number of different ways. One might prefer,
for instance, to re-price all assets during the closeout period using
Monte Carlo simulations, rather than using historical prices for
equivalent time frames. The important result, however, is the def-
inition of a P&L structure containing, for each state of the world
(i.e. risk scenario), the cash ﬂow stream (i.e. on
t þ 1; t þ 2; . . . ; t þ H) for every position in the portfolio.
The P&L structure can be conveniently aggregated into a set of
cash ﬂow structures for each state of the world, so that a number
of consolidated risk metrics can be calculated. For instance, adding
up all cash ﬂows for a given state of the world simply yields the
cost of closing out the entire portfolio in that speciﬁc scenario.
Such results can be used to compute a number of convenient close-
out risk metrics, for instance the 99th worst-case scenario, the
95th worst-case scenario shortfall risk or the absolute worst-case
scenario. Nonetheless, another important piece of information that
can be derived from the cash ﬂow structures is the maximum
liquidity (funding) need during the closeout process. The impor-
tance of this ﬁgure cannot be emphasized enough, as clearing-
houses must have the means to cope with the default
management process as a whole, which may entail funding needs
far superior to the expected total loss given the closeout process.
For instance, suppose that, for a given portfolio, the worst-case
scenario is a negative cash ﬂow of $100 M on t þ 1 and a positive
cash ﬂow of $90 M on t þ 3. In this case, the total loss given the
closeout process is $10 M ($100 M + $90 M). However, there is
a substantial liquidity gap ($100 M) from t þ 1 to t þ 3 that must
be either backed by liquidity management mechanisms (i.e. credit
lines) or liquid collateral (i.e. cash or assets that are cash equiva-
lent). Accordingly, the CORE methodology deﬁnes two closeout risk
metrics: the total permanent loss and the total transient loss. The
total permanent loss reﬂects the net cost of closing out a defaul-
ter’s portfolio, whereas the total transient loss reﬂects the extra
funding need in excess of the total permanent loss. From these
metrics, the CORE risk measurement c-value is obtained.3. Optimal closeout strategy
Portfolio selection problems have always played a signiﬁcant
role in the modern theories of ﬁnance, as evidenced by the vast
amount of related literature produced over the last 60 years.4 From
the early works of Markowitz (1952), Tobin (1958) and Sharp (1964),
subsequent efforts covered a broad range of different ﬁelds, from
dynamic hedging, with groundbreaking contributions of Dufﬁe and
Jackson (1990) and Dufﬁe and Richardson (1991), to asset-liability4 See Merton (1998) for a comprehensive account.management (ALM), as discussed in Gülpinar and Pachamanova
(2013) and references therein. Moreover, traditional risk manage-
ment models have also beneﬁted from such theoretical develop-
ments, as in the case of VaR and CVaR, presented in Rockafellar
and Uryasev (2000) and Alexander et al. (2006). This theoretical
framework also underpins the deﬁnition of the optimal closeout
strategies in the CORE methodology.
3.1. Portfolio, closeout strategy and risk scenarios
A portfolio is a collection of I ﬁnancial instruments, represented
by the vector Q 0 ¼ ½Q1;0 Q2;0 . . . QI;0, where each Qi;0 corresponds
to the total quantity of an instrument i at an initial evaluation time
t þ 0. Additionally, for any given CCP participant, the vector Q 0
contains not only the whole set of ﬁnancial instruments to be set-
tled via the central counterparty (i.e. positions), but also all assets
posted as collateral, including cash. As a consequence, a positive
closeout result means that the portfolio is properly collateralized,
whereas a negative closeout result denotes inadequate collateral-
ization (i.e. the portfolio is undermargined).
In this context, a closeout strategy can be viewed as a scheme
for liquidating and/or settling all portfolio positions given some
ﬁnite time horizon. A closeout strategy can be as simple as
liquidating all positions as soon as possible (naïve strategy), or it
may have a more complex format with a set of rules and restric-
tions that have to be followed – for instance, the largest position
admitted for trading on a single date for a speciﬁc ﬁnancial instru-
ment. In any case, given a portfolio of ﬁnancial instruments and a
set of rules and restrictions concerning the liquidation process of
each one of its constituents, the optimal closeout strategy is,
among all possible strategies, the one that yields the smallest pos-
sible risk measure.
The closeout strategy can be conveniently represented by the
matrix Q IH , where each element Qi;h expresses the quantity of
asset i liquidated at time t þ h;h 2 H,
Q IH ¼
Q1;1 Q1;2 . . . Q1;H
Q2;1 Q2;2 . . . Q2;H
. . . . . . . . . . . .
QI;1 QI;2 . . . QI;H
2
6664
3
7775:
Accordingly, H ¼ f1;2; . . . ;Hg represents the liquidation horizon
and H corresponds to the length of the closeout process, meaning
that all positions must be liquidated until t þ H. Without loss of
generality, let also qi;h denote the closeout strategy in relative terms,
that is, qi;h ¼ Qi;hQi;0, resulting in the new matrix qIH .
Uncertainty is modeled as potential outcomes resulting from
different states of nature. Formally, uncertainty assumes the form
of a probability space X;I; Pð Þ;x 2 X. Measurable on this space
there is a series of random vectors SjðxÞ; j 2 f1;2; . . . ; Jg, each
representing the potential realization of a ﬁnancial variable along
the liquidation horizon H. More speciﬁcally, SjðxÞ expresses a risk
factor path, given by SjðxÞ ¼ ½Sj;1ðxÞ Sj;2ðxÞ . . . Sj;HðxÞ. Each ele-
ment Sj;hðxÞ denotes the variable j value at a speciﬁc time t þ h.
Hence, the stochastic matrix RðxÞJH formed by all random vectors
considered deﬁnes the set of applicable risk scenarios
RðxÞJH ¼
S1;1ðxÞ S1;2ðxÞ . . . S1;HðxÞ
S2;1ðxÞ S2;2ðxÞ . . . S2;HðxÞ
. . . . . . . . . . . .
SJ;1ðxÞ SJ;2ðxÞ . . . SJ;HðxÞ
2
6664
3
7775:
In order to simplify notation, the dependence on the state of nature
may be omitted, so the set can be represented just by R. Any
particular value of the matrix associated with a speciﬁc state
xk 2 X is denominated as ‘realization of a risk scenario’, or simply
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samples of risk scenarios is expressed by R.
3.2. Deﬁning the optimal closeout strategy
One of the main – if not the most important – objectives of cen-
tral counterparty risk management is to ensure the CCP’s ability to
meet its ﬁnancial obligations in a timely and orderly fashion even
in the event of one or more simultaneous participant defaults. As
emphasized in CPSS/IOSCO (2012), rules and procedures to manage
a participant’s default must not only protect the CCP, but also avoid
market disruptions. Hence, such rules and procedures must include
provisions for managing and closing out the defaulter’s positions in
a prudent and orderly manner. The ﬁnancial resources available for
managing such defaults (i.e. margin requirements) must be deﬁned
accordingly, that is, taking into account a well-organized closeout
process. This problem becomes more complex when different
ﬁnancial instruments have distinct closeout proﬁles, making it
more difﬁcult to calculate the adequate amount of ﬁnancial
resources needed to manage a default. In this regard, for instance,
Regulation (EU) 648/2012, states that a ‘‘CCP shall adopt models
and parameters in setting its margin requirements that capture
risk characteristics of the product cleared and take into account
the interval between margin collections, market liquidity and pos-
sibility of changes over the duration of the transaction’’ (EMIR,
2012, article 41).
Therefore, the optimal closeout strategy must minimize market
and liquidity risks in the presence of relevant trading, settlement
and liquidity constraints. The problem is formulated in such a
way so that its solution is robust in respect to price variations, mar-
ket elasticity and cash ﬂows mismatches. As a result, the optimal
closeout strategy preserves natural hedges present in the portfolio
throughout the liquidation process. Additionally, a set of restric-
tions deﬁnes the problem’s boundary conditions, incorporating
not only logical constraints but also real life market frictions. The
constraints are deﬁned as follows.
Zero inventory at t þ H. All non-cash positions have to be equal
to zero at the end of the closeout process, t þ H,
XH
h¼1
qi;h ¼ 1;8i: ð1Þ
Monotonically decreasing inventory. The closeout strategy cannot
create new positions or increase, in module, pre-existing ones,
0 6 qi;h 6 1;8i;8h: ð2Þ
No partial liquidation. Some ﬁnancial instruments do not allow
for partial liquidation (i.e. fractionating). This is usually the case
for OTC contracts that must be auctioned by the CCP in the case
of a default,
qi;h ¼ 1; for some i and h: ð3Þ
Execution lag. There is a minimum interval between the
moment a default is detected and the beginning of the execution
of the default procedures. This period varies for different instru-
ments and is denoted si for instrument i. Also, for less liquid ﬁnan-
cial instruments (e.g. OTC contracts) the execution lag can
incorporate the time necessary to organize an auction or to ﬁnd
an interested counterparty,
qi;h ¼ 0;h < si 2 H: ð4Þ
Market depth. The total amount daily traded (i.e. liquidated) on
every ﬁnancial instrument cannot exceed its pre-deﬁned market
depth, Ki,
qi;h 6 ji ¼ Ki=Qi;0;8h: ð5ÞIn order to deﬁne the objective function of the decision prob-
lem, let wiðrk;hÞ represent the P&L relative to instrument i in a
given risk scenario rk and time h of the liquidation horizon. The
function can assume two different formats, depending on whether
the instrument generates a stream of daily cash ﬂows based on
changes in its market value or not. This is the case, for instance,
of ﬁnancial derivatives that pay variation margin (e.g. futures
contracts). This result function is expressed as
wiðrk;hÞ ¼
/i  Qi;0  Piðrk;hÞ  Piðrk;h 1Þ½ ; i 2 IM
/i  Qi;0  Piðrk;hÞ½ ; o:w:
(
where Piðrk;hÞ is the price function for one unit of instrument i eval-
uated at risk scenario rk and time h. For long positions /i ¼ 1,
whereas for short positions /i ¼ 1. IM represents the group of
the instruments that pay variation margin. The price function can
assume different formats given the characteristics of each instru-
ment considered. In the case of instruments that pay variation mar-
gin, the result function represents the stream of daily cash ﬂows
that have to be settled until the instrument’s maturity date. In the
case of instruments that do not pay variation margin, however,
changes in market value do not generate cash ﬂows. For these
instruments the result function yields the total ﬁnancial result asso-
ciated with a change in the inventory (i.e. liquidation).
The result function can be aggregated to represent instrument i
accumulated P&L until time h of the liquidation horizon. Let
Liðrk;hÞ denote this value,
Liðrk; hÞ ¼
P
d6hðqi;d þ si;dÞ  wiðrk; dÞ; i 2 IMP
d6hqi;d  wiðrk; dÞ; o:w:
(
where si;h represents the outstanding inventory of instrument i at
time h, given by si;h ¼ 1
P
d6hqi;d, introduced to measure the vari-
ation margin resulting from open positions. The aggregated result
function Lðrk;hÞ accumulates the P&L for all the instruments of
the portfolio until a given time h of the liquidation horizon, denoted
by
Lðrk;hÞ ¼
XI
i¼1
Liðrk;hÞ: ð6Þ
As the CORE methodology aims at minimizing not only perma-
nent, but also transient losses (i.e. liquidity gaps) associated with
the closeout process, the aggregated result function must be
assessed for all h 2 H. In other words, both the maximum liquidity
gap and the expected total loss given the closeout process must be
considered in the decision problem. In order to incorporate this
characteristic, let ‘k represent the minimum value of the aggre-
gated result function over the liquidation horizon for a risk
scenario rk; ‘k ¼ min Lðrk;1Þ; Lðrk;2Þ; . . . ; Lðrk;HÞð Þ.
The result functions and respective ‘k values are calculated for
all risk scenarios in R, and the worst-case result used as the
decision risk metric. It is important to notice that the closeout
strategy must be robust enough to minimize the losses considering
all possible states and, more importantly, in adverse extreme situ-
ations such as the one represented by the worst-case scenario. If
the closeout strategy is efﬁcient in this scenario, then the results
associated with less austere scenarios must be less unfavorable.
In this case, the worst-case optimization, also known as ‘‘minimax’’
principle, yields better results than other techniques, such as
expected value maximization or variance minimization, that have
a focus on moderate changes.
New portfolio selection theories using worst-case optimization
have attracted a lot of attention in the last decades, as discussed in
Polak et al. (2010). A particularly appealing characteristic of the
minimax principle is that it does not require any underlying
probability model, but only a dataset of realized (or potential
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(1998). Hence, any static assumption concerning the probability
distribution of the states of nature can have its importance dimin-
ished, circumventing the problem of considering extremely
adverse scenarios.
In addition to these beneﬁts, the minimax principle also offers
relevant computational advantages. More speciﬁcally, given a set
of linear constraints, the principle can be conveniently represented
as a linear programming (LP) problem. Over a discrete domain, the
objective function is piecewise linear and concave. Considering the
CCP’s necessity to calculate risk on an intraday, near-time basis,
the existence of standard procedures capable of delivering fast
and accurate solutions is a highly desirable characteristic. More-
over, as discussed in Murthagh (1981), the minimum function
offers superior computational properties.
Hence, deﬁning the optimal closeout strategy entails determin-
ing the liquidation scheme that minimizes transient and
permanent losses in the worst-case scenario, expressed as
max
q
min
rk2R
‘k; ð7Þ
s.t.
constraint (1)–(5).
Different formulations for the objective function and the deci-
sion problemmay be attained, depending on underlying risk model
and corresponding assumptions, as presented in Avellaneda and
Cont (2013). The current proposal intrinsically engenders desirable
features such as superior scalability concerning multiple portfolio
conﬁgurations and market restrictions; straightforward handling
of path dependent instruments and; efﬁcient transient loss evalu-
ation, differentiating variation margin and total liquidation value
of inventory.4. Potential loss evaluation
The deﬁnition of the optimal closeout strategy provides the
means for calculating the P&L relative to each one of the risk
scenarios, rk 2 R. Speciﬁcally, conditional on a given rk, the P&L
measures are calculated for each instrument i and time horizon
h, resulting in a matrix VIHðrkÞ of ﬁnancial values mi;hðrkÞ,
VðrkÞ ¼
m1;1ðrkÞ m1;2ðrkÞ . . . m1;HðrkÞ
m2;1ðrkÞ m2;2ðrkÞ . . . m2;HðrkÞ
. . . . . . . . . . . .
mI;1ðrkÞ mI;2ðrkÞ . . . mI;HðrkÞ
2
6664
3
7775:
Differently from the result function, these values represent single
(i.e. non-accumulated) P&Ls obtained during liquidation time hori-
zon under a speciﬁc realization of a state of nature. In particular, for
qi;h and s

i;h denoting, respectively, the optimal liquidated position
and remaining inventory,
mi;hðrkÞ ¼
ðqi;h þ si;hÞ  wiðrk;hÞ; i 2 IM
qi;h  wiðrk;hÞ; o:w:
(
:5 Consider, for instance, a CCP whose total size of committed liquidity facilities is
equal to LF. Assuming ND simultaneous defaults, then KðMLÞ can be written as
KðMLÞ ¼ ð1=NDÞ  LF. More complex formulations can also take into account the fact
that one or more liquidity providers might also fail, and/or the fact that the potential
defaulter is also a liquidity provider.5. Permanent and transient loss measures
The P&L values, represented by the matrix VðrkÞ, can be conve-
niently aggregated as to yield two different measures: the total
permanent loss and the total transient loss. The total permanent
loss represents the ﬁnal ﬁnancial result associated with the close-
out process. Accordingly, the total permanent loss is calculated as
the sum of the ﬁnancial results for all instruments during the term
of the closeout strategy. Particularly, let mhðrkÞ ¼
PI
i¼1mi;hðrkÞ
express the aggregated value of all instruments for time h of theliquidation horizon. Therefore, the permanent loss for a given risk
scenario can be deﬁned as
PLðrkÞ ¼ min
XH
h¼1
mhðrkÞ;0
 !
: ð8Þ
Although the permanent loss can be considered a relevant
metric for assessing the ﬁnancial result of a closeout strategy, it
provides only a partial view of the portfolio’s risk. As a matter of
fact, sizable liquidity gaps (i.e. funding needs) during the closeout
process can also have a signiﬁcant impact on CCP’s activities, as
they have to be properly covered either by liquidity facilities (e.g.
credit lines) or by very liquid, cash-equivalent, collateral. In this
sense, the total transient loss reﬂects the extra funding need in
excess of the permanent loss, deﬁned as
MLðrkÞ ¼ PLðrkÞ
min m1ðrkÞ; m1ðrkÞ þ m2ðrkÞ; . . . ;
XH
h¼1
mhðrkÞ;0
 !
: ð9Þ
The practical application of total transient loss estimates
depends, fundamentally, on the CCP’s approach towards its liquid-
ity risk management. A CCP might decide, for instance, that all
liquidity gaps relative to the closeout process are to be covered
by existing liquidity facilities. In this case, the total transient loss
estimates can be used to ascertain the adequacy of such liquidity
facilities vis-à-vis potential defaults. In the so called self-ﬁnancing
model, on the other hand, the collateral posted by any CCP partic-
ipant (i.e. margin) should be enough to cover not only the perma-
nent losses arising from its positions, but also any funding
mismatches in the process (i.e. liquidity gaps). In this case, a cash
surplus is expected at the end of the closeout process. Such deci-
sions inﬂuence the total transient loss metric through KðMLÞ,
which deﬁnes the amount of the total transient loss that has to
be considered in terms of margin requirements.5 Therefore, consid-
ering a particular risk scenario, the total transient loss is given by
TLðrkÞ ¼ min MLðrkÞ þKðMLÞ;0ð Þ: ð10Þ
The sum of the total permanent and the total transient loss for
every risk scenario measures the total potential loss associated
with a particular state of nature. The closeout risk estimate is thus
obtained considering the least (minimum) value for all risk
scenarios. In particular, the resulting value denotes the CORE
methodology risk measure c-value, expressed by
c-value ¼ min
rk2R
PLðrkÞ þ TLðrkÞð Þ: ð11Þ
Although other forms of aggregation may be considered, the c-value
is the relevant proposed metric for deﬁning initial margin values in
CCPs.
6. A numerical example
The most signiﬁcant features of the CORE methodology can be
better understood by the means of a simple, yet relevant numerical
example. Suppose the following portfolio of ﬁnancial instruments
presented in Table 1. All positions can be closed out in one day,
except the ETF forward and the FX swap that, being OTC products,
require a 10-day closeout period. Additionally, there are no market
depth restrictions for any instruments except the commodity put
option, which is limited to 75 contracts per day. The market
Table 1
Portfolio composition – long and short positions are represented by positive and negative signs respectively; prices are expressed as unitary values; FP stands for future price;
maturity is denoted in days; and n.a. stands for non-applicable.
Instrument Position Price MtM Strike/FP Maturity
ETF 300 100.00 30,000.00 n.a. n.a.
ETF forward (deliverable) 280 15.24 4,267.53 90.00 360
Commodity put option 200 4.46 892.94 55.00 90
FX futures 5000 1.9992 0.00 n.a. 3
FX call option 15,000 0.01 104.17 2.40 180
FX swap 5000 0.2878 1,438.94 1.80 360
1 Y ﬁxed rate gov. bond 1000 0.94 941.76 n.a. 360
Table 3
Naïve closeout strategy – quantities liquidated for each instrument of the portfolio
along the closeout horizon.
Instrument 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ETF 300 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ETF forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 280
Commodity put option 75 75 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FX futures 5000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FX call option 15,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FX swap 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5000
1 Y ﬁxed rate gov. bond 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 2. Without loss of generality, volatilities and interest rates
are deemed constant during the whole closeout period.
Accordingly, ‘‘single risk ﬁgure’’ loss estimates can be calculated
by reassessing the value of the portfolio in all market scenarios for
a ﬁxed holding period (HP), and thus selecting the worst possible
outcome. In this case, the worst case scenario corresponds to
[ETF (Down); Commodity (Down); FX (Down)], and loss estimates
range from 4.53% (HP = 1) to 9.16% (HP = 10). As discussed in Sec-
tion 2, transposed to the CCP world, that would entail liquidating
(closing out) all positions at the same time, be it at t þ 1; t þ 5
or t þ 10. It is not difﬁcult to see, however, that previously deﬁned
market restrictions would be violated. Speciﬁcally, (a) for all HPs,
except t þ 10, the OTC market closeout period is not respected;
(b) the market depth restriction of the commodity option is vio-
lated in all cases; (c) for HPs from t þ 4 to t þ 10 there is an impli-
cit assumption that the FX futures position would be rolled over, as
it matures on t þ 3.
Another alternative would be to segregate different asset
classes into different silos, so risk values could be calculated in
accordance to speciﬁc holding periods. In this case, Silo ‘‘A’’ could
be deﬁned as the portfolio containing all cash instruments, Silo
‘‘B’’ as the portfolio containing all listed derivatives, and Silo ‘‘C’’
as containing all OTC derivatives. For the sake of simplicity it is
assumed that both Silo ‘‘A’’ and Silo ‘‘B’’ share the same HP, ranging
from t þ 1 to t þ 10, whereas Silo ‘‘C’’ has a ﬁxed HP equal to
t þ 10. Then the worst case scenarios for Silo ‘‘A’’, Silo ‘‘B’’ and Silo
‘‘C’’ are, regardless the HP, [ETF (Down)], [Commodity (Down); FX
(Down)] and [ETF (Up); FX (Up)], respectively. As one would expect
from the different worst case scenarios considered for the ETF and
FX risk factors, risk estimates are noticeably higher in this case,
ranging from 57.84% (HP = 1 for both Silo ‘‘A’’ and Silo ‘‘B’’) to
76.15% (HP = 9 for both Silo ‘‘A’’ and Silo ‘‘B’’). Hence, albeit being
able to circumvent the multiple HP problem, the silo approach
tends to overestimate risks in truly diversiﬁed, multi asset-class
portfolios.
Considering a closeout approach to solve this problem, on the
other hand, would allow for consistent market scenarios, even in
the presence of multiple holding periods and liquidity restrictions.
As mentioned in the previous sections, the critical question, in this
case, concerns the deﬁnition of the closeout strategy that, subjectTable 2
Risk scenarios – stress scenarios for the risk factors of the portfolio along the closeout ho
Risk factor 1 (%) 2 (%) 3 (%) 4 (%) 5
ETF +12 +4 +1 +1 +1
12 4 1 1 1
Commodity +9 +3 +1 +1 +1
9 3 1 1 1
FX +6 +2 +1 +1 +1
6 2 1 1 1to a set of market restrictions, minimizes potential losses. A risk
averse, naïve strategy, would be to closeout all positions at the ear-
liest possible time, given the assumption that risks scale up with
time. Table 3 presents the naïve closeout strategy for this portfolio.
Albeit consistent with liquidity (commodity option) and hold-
ing period (OTC derivatives) constraints, this closeout strategy
clearly fails to give due weight to risk offsetting positions. Actually,
hedged positions, such as the ETF/ETF Forward pair, are in fact dis-
mantled because of the naïve strategy’s risk myopia. As a result, its
worst-case scenario [ETF (Up); Commodity (Down); FX (Up)] yields
a total loss of 22.90%. Here there is an evident advantage in
employing the concept of optimal closeout strategy such as the
one deﬁned in the CORE methodology. Using the optimization
approach described in the previous sections produces the follow-
ing optimal closeout strategy, reported in Table 4.
In this case, apart from being consistent with the pre-deﬁned
liquidity and holding period constraints, the optimal closeout
strategy also calibrates carefully the total amount of instruments
to be liquidated/settled on each date so as to minimize the overall
closeout risk. It can also deal with less intuitive situations, such as
the one posed by the group of FX derivatives – futures (linear,
short-term), options (non-linear, long-term) and OTC swap (linear,
long term). As a result, the worst-case scenario [ETF (Up); Com-
modity (Down); FX (Up)] for the optimal closeout strategy yields
a total loss of 1.79%, much less, thus, than the naïve strategy. The
fact that this value is even smaller than the ‘‘single risk ﬁgure’’ loss
estimate for HP = 1 may, at ﬁrst, seem somewhat counterintuitive,rizon.
(%) 6 (%) 7 (%) 8 (%) 9 (%) 10 (%)
+1 +1 +1 +1 +1
1 1 1 1 1
+1 +1 +1 +1 +1
1 1 1 1 1
+1 +1 +1 +1 +1
1 1 1 1 1
Table 4
Optimal closeout strategy – quantities liquidated for each instrument of the portfolio
along the closeout horizon.
Instrument 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ETF 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 260
ETF forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 280
Commodity put option 75 75 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FX futures 415 0 4585 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FX call option 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15,000
FX swap 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5000
1 Y ﬁxed rate gov. bond 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1000
Table 5
Liquidation strategy efﬁciency ratio – the ratio of permanent loss from naïve strategy
to CORE, PLn=PLc; the ratio of permanent loss plus transient loss from naïve strategy to
CORE, ðPLn þ TLnÞ=ðPLc þ TLcÞ. Losses are evaluated at real market scenarios.
Month-year Group PLn=PLc (%) ðPLn þ TLnÞ=ðPLc þ TLcÞ (%)
September-2008 122 121
Small 87 105
Medium 81 91
Large 130 128
X large 136 131
October-2008 103 111
Small 117 129
Medium 120 126
Large 95 120
X large 98 102
November-2008 123 136
Small 226 251
Medium 82 93
Large 141 143
X large 110 113
December-2008 88 102
Small 80 136
Medium 87 93
Large 82 102
X large 90 98
January-2009 102 112
Small 126 178
Medium 92 95
Large 104 112
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First, it accurately takes into account the effects of having non-lin-
ear instruments in the portfolio and, most importantly, the
implications of deferring the liquidation of such positions. This is
evident when the worst-case scenario for FX positions for the ‘‘sin-
gle risk ﬁgure’’ loss estimate (Down) is compared to the
corresponding CORE worst-case scenario (Up). As a matter of fact,
this highlights the importance of considering a broad set of scenar-
ios for calculating closeout risk ﬁgures, including (plausible) ‘‘zig-
zag’’ scenarios. By having only two scenarios, this example simply
allowed the algorithm to deliberately postpone the liquidation of
the call option in order to get the most of its value. Fig. A.1 in
Appendix compares the results of all four methodologies.X large 99 102
February-2009 117 124
Small 198 210
Medium 94 97
Large 127 129
X large 103 1097. Empirical tests
7.1. Data model
The CORE methodology was implemented and tested using 40
‘‘real life’’ portfolios consisting of BM&FBovespa derivatives
contracts.6 The group of portfolios was divided into 4 equivalently
distributed subclasses: small portfolios, containing up to 29
instruments; medium sized portfolios, containing from 30 to 89
instruments; large portfolios, containing from 90 to 239 instruments
and very large portfolios, with over 239 instruments. Different trad-
ing patterns were represented in the sample: relative-value trades,
hedging strategies and outright positions, among others. Instru-
ments included listed ﬁnancial derivatives (futures and options),
listed commodities (futures and options), OTC swaps and exotic
options, totaling 39 different types of ﬁnancial instruments.
Table B.1 in the Appendix presents more detailed information about
the portfolios.7
The portfolios were evaluated considering the prevailing
market conditions of 2008/2009, particularly the 6 months period
containing the most severe ﬂuctuations in the Brazilian market,
from 09/01/2008 to 02/27/2009. During this period the Brazilian
real to US dollar FX rate experienced changes of 11.69% and
9.14% in two consecutive trading sections, depreciating from
$1.64 to $2.29 in just 5 weeks. The Ibovespa index, the most impor-
tant Brazilian equities index, slipped more than 43% from the
beginning of the period until 10/24/2008. Circuit breakers and
price limits were triggered several times in order to avoid market
disruption. Similarly, local interest rates reacted to counterbalance6 BM&FBovespa is the result of the merger between BM&F and Bovespa in 2008.
The company provides trading, registration, clearing and CCP services to the Brazilian
equities, equity derivatives, ﬁnancial and commodities derivatives (listed and OTC),
FX and government bonds markets. In 2013 it ranked #1 by number of single stock
options traded and #3 by number of interest rate futures traded, according to WFE
(2014). It is also ranked among the top 5 largest exchanges in the world by market
value.
7 All information used with permission from BM&FBovespa. Common practice
conﬁdentiality measures were employed during the course of the tests.extraordinarily high money outﬂows. The 1Y rate increased from
14.57% to 16.44% by 10/24/2008, experiencing daily changes of
135 bps and 96 bps in two occasions. Figs. A.2, A.3, A.4 exhibit
the historical patterns of these variations prior, during and after
the analyzed period.
The c-values for all 40 portfolios were calculated using 10,000
Monte Carlo simulations. Different statistical models were
employed to simulate each relevant risk factor according to its
characteristics. In total, the exercise considered 37 different risk
factors: 13 spot prices, 14 yield and forward price curves and 10
volatility surfaces. The models were calibrated using as benchmark
limits for maximum and minimum variations the very same stress
scenarios deﬁned by BM&FBovespa for margin calculation pur-
poses during that period. These and other relevant parameters
are described in Table B.2 in Appendix. Finally, considering the
dimension of the tests, a 2.90 GHz, 32 CPU and 256 GB memory
machine was employed, performing the optimization process
using a Gurobi 5.6 Optimizer.87.2. Test results
The test was speciﬁcally designed to assess the performance of
the CORE methodology relative to corresponding naïve closeout
strategies. In order to allow for an equivalent comparison, the same
constraints used in the CORE methodology regarding execution
lags (closeout periods) and market depths (liquidity) were also
considered in the deﬁnition of each corresponding naïve strategy.
Accordingly, positions are closed out at the earliest possible time8 See www.gurobi.com for more information about the optimization tool.
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then the closeout process continues in the subsequent date, up to a
limit of 10 days, when all remaining inventory has to be settled.
Both the closeout strategies deﬁned in accordance with the
CORE methodology and the closeout strategies deﬁned in accor-
dance with the naïve scheme were evaluated considering the real
market conditions previously described, yielding thus different
transient and permanent loss estimates. Table 5 presents the aver-
age daily ratio of the loss metrics in both cases. A ratio above 100%
means that the naïve strategy is less efﬁcient than the CORE strat-
egy, i.e., yields bigger losses. As a result, the application of the
naïve strategy for margin calculation purposes would entail heftier,
undue capital requirements from market participants. The data
shows that the CORE closeout strategy consistently outperforms
the naïve strategy considering both permanent and transient
losses. The only exception, however, is for some medium sized
portfolios. What these portfolios have in common is the fact that
they all hold highly concentrated positions in one or more instru-
ments. In this case liquidity restrictions apply, so optimal choices
are circumvented and beneﬁts from hedging deteriorate
accordingly.
Notwithstanding the fact CORE methodology aims at minimiz-
ing the combination of transient and permanent losses, Table 5
shows that the optimal closeout strategy may yield efﬁcient ﬁnal
(i.e. permanent) results. Considering all 4,026 observations from
40 portfolios and 6 months of data, in 74% of the cases CORE strat-
egy yields lower or equal permanent losses than the naïve strategy.
Additionally, this ratio reaches 87% for the group of small portfo-
lios. These and other statistics are presented on Tables B.3 and B.4.
8. Final considerations
The CORE methodology was developed as a reaction to the prac-
tical challenges posed by the problem of integrating four distinct
clearinghouses - equities (spot, securities lending and single name
derivatives), derivatives (ﬁnancial and commodity listed and OTC
derivatives), FX (interbank spot FX market) and government bonds
(spot, repo and securities lending). The fundamental question in
this regard was how to deliver capital efﬁciency (i.e. risk offsets)
without losing consistency and robustness. The conclusion was
that no static methodology could yield adequate results for mini-
mally heterogeneous portfolios. Considering default managementFig. A.1. Methodoprocedures, and thus the closeout process, as a set of actions car-
ried out in the time continuum subject to a number of ‘‘real life’’
market constraints, on the other hand, allowed for a more accurate
image of reality. Hence, risk offsets could be implemented in a way
that was consistent with the actual workings of the markets con-
sidered and, equally important, also consistent with the clearing-
house’s own default procedures. Actually, this is the single most
important value proposition of the CORE methodology: to establish
a consistent link between the margin deﬁnition processes, the
clearinghouse’s default procedures and the actual workings of
the markets served.
As one would expect, there is no single way of implementing
CORE’s three-tiered methodology. Thus, considering CORE an
approach or a framework, rather than a self-contained methodol-
ogy, is perhaps far more appropriate. Even deﬁning the closeout
strategy, for instance, can be achieved by means other than linear
optimization – the choice depends fundamentally on the complex-
ity of the portfolios considered and the degree of accuracy and risk
aversion desired. As an alternative, the quadratic programming
problem for mean–variance portfolio optimization can be applied
as a decision framework. New research on the topic would increase
the number of practical applications, or reduce the mathematical
and computational complexity of existing ones.
Finally, it is also worth considering, for that matter, the poten-
tial range of applications of the CORE approach. As a natural exten-
sion, the approach can be employed in other environments that
face similar default management problems, such as the prime bro-
kerage industry. Additionally, considering the other elements of
the CCP’s safeguard structure, the approach can render valuable
metrics to estimate the adequate size of default funds and liquidity
assistance facilities.Acknowledgement
This work could not be performed without the valuable contri-
butions of many colleagues at BM&FBovespa.Appendix A. Figures
Figs. A.1–A.4.logies results.
Fig. A.2. Highest returns in 2 days (bps) – 1 Y pre-ﬁxed interest rate.
Fig. A.3. Highest returns in 2 days (%) – dollar FX rate.
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Fig. A.4. Highest returns in 2 days (%) – Ibovespa index.
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Tables B.1–B.4.Table B.1
Average portfolio conﬁguration – average values calculated over portfolios within the gro
Group Instruments Listed futures
Small 1 to 29 14
Medium 30 to 89 38
Large 90 to 239 45
X large Over 239 68
Table B.2
Main instruments parameters – s represents the ﬁrst day-to-trade; j represents the maxim
Min Stress Scenario is assessed for main risk factor. If the risk factor is a yield curve or a for
applicable.
Instrument Description s j
DOL FX dollar futures 2 10,000
EUR FX euro futures 2 3000
DI1 Interest rate futures 2 162,000
DDI Interest rate futures 2 10,000
IND Ibovespa futures 2 12,000
ICF Coffee futures 2 1100
BGI Live Cattle futures 2 1000
SOJ Soybean futures 2 1800
DOLOP FX dollar option 5 2500
INDOP Ibovespa option 5 2500
DI1OP Interest rate option 5 20,750
DOLOF OTC dollar option 10 n.a.
INDOF OTC Ibovespa option 10 n.a.
SDC Dollar  DI swap 10 n.a.
SDP Pre-ﬁxed  DI swap 10 n.a.
SDM Inﬂation  DI swap 10 n.a.
SDL Inﬂation  DI swap 10 n.a.up and along the sample period.
Listed options OTC swaps OTC options
1
9 3 3
54 20 31
157 407 39
um amount to trade; Main Risk Factor is selected regarding the price sensitivity; Max/
ward price curve, the values represent the 1 Y stress scenario; and n.a. stands for non-
Main risk factor Max/Min Stress Scenario in s
Dollar FX rate +15.0%/15.0%
Euro FX rate +22.0%/22.0%
Pre-ﬁxed curve +350 bps/330 bps
Dollar coupon curve +575 bps/450 bps
Ibovespa index +20.0%/20.0%
Coffee forward curve +6.8%/6.8%
Cattle forward curve +5.3%/5.3%
Soybean forward curve +4.0%/4.0%
Dollar FX rate +20.0%/20.0%
Ibovespa index +23.8%/23.8%
Pre-ﬁxed curve +382 bps/350 bps
Dollar FX rate +30.0%/30.0%
Ibovespa index +30.0%/30.0%
Dollar FX rate +30.0%/30.0%
Pre-ﬁxed curve +434 bps/384 bps
IGPM spot +3.0%/1.5%
IPCA spot +2.0%/1.5%
Table B.3
Permanent loss liquidation strategy efﬁciency ratio distribution – the entries represent respectively the number of cases that permanent loss liquidation strategy efﬁciency ratio,
ðPLnÞ=ðPLcÞ, is lower than 100%, equal to 100% and higher than 100%. Additionally, if PL ¼ 0 for both naïve and CORE strategies, then the observation is classiﬁed as 100%.
Month-year Group <100% 100% >100% Total
September-2008 164 408 269 841
Small 18 113 73 204
Medium 74 107 43 224
Large 43 111 39 193
X large 29 77 114 220
October-2008 210 298 250 758
Small 27 95 63 185
Medium 59 37 60 156
Large 35 92 39 166
X large 89 74 88 251
November-2008 144 200 246 590
Small 13 49 72 134
Medium 53 26 35 114
Large 24 50 42 116
X large 54 75 97 226
December-2008 207 189 233 629
Small 17 49 83 149
Medium 48 27 53 128
Large 37 44 33 114
X large 105 69 64 238
January-2009 190 243 217 650
Small 26 62 59 147
Medium 40 63 71 174
Large 51 54 43 148
X large 73 64 44 181
February-2009 133 210 215 558
Small 20 64 44 128
Medium 36 58 48 142
Large 34 42 54 130
X large 43 46 69 158
Table B.4
Permanent and transient loss liquidation strategy efﬁciency ratio distribution – the
entries represent respectively the number of cases that permanent plus transient loss
liquidation strategy efﬁciency ratio, ðPLn þ TLnÞ=ðPLc þ TLcÞ, is lower than 100%, equal
to 100% and higher than 100%. Additionally, if PLþ TL ¼ 0 for both naïve and CORE
strategies, then the observation is classiﬁed as 100%.
Month-year Group <100% 100% >100% Total
September-2008 242 401 198 841
Small 13 177 14 204
Medium 95 96 33 224
Large 92 62 39 193
X large 42 66 112 220
October-2008 230 292 236 758
Small 20 135 30 185
Medium 68 27 61 156
Large 50 76 40 166
X large 92 54 105 251
November-2008 141 225 224 590
Small 7 99 28 134
Medium 45 34 35 114
Large 24 46 46 116
X large 65 46 115 226
December-2008 186 223 220 629
Small 10 112 27 149
Medium 41 38 49 128
Large 33 41 40 114
X large 102 32 104 238
January-2009 198 254 198 650
Small 14 106 27 147
Medium 45 82 47 174
Large 62 36 50 148
X large 77 30 74 181
February-2009 151 195 212 558
Small 13 87 28 128
Medium 43 69 30 142
Large 39 32 59 130
X large 56 7 95 158
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